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5Executive summary
For decades, Germany has been generating large export surpluses. The associated 
accumulation of assets vis-à-vis other countries provides one possibility of enabling a 
high standard of living for the ageing German population in the future. However, there is 
no guarantee that these asset investments will maintain their value over the long term. 
If Germany‘s cumulative current account surpluses between 2000 and 2017 are compared 
with the change in its net foreign assets in the same period, the result is a book loss in the 
hundreds of billions of euros. Even if many of these price and exchange rate-related losses 
in asset value could be compensated for, there is no guarantee that all losses can actually 
be offset in the long term. Given these uncertainties and the fact that Germany shows a 
considerable weakness in overall economic investment, it is quite conceivable that higher 
domestic investment could constitute a better macroeconomic provision to deal with the 
ageing of the population.
6Export surpluses and asset 
accumulation
If Germany exports more than it imports, it lives beneath its means because not all goods 
produced in its own country are consumed. This results in two effects regarding future 
opportunities for consumption:
•  Germany spends less money on imports than it earns through exports. An export 
surplus therefore results in a accumulation of assets vis-à-vis other countries (see 
Box 1). The investments in assets result in additional income – for example, dividends 
or interest income. Thus the opportunities for consumption in the following years 
increase, because the income received from abroad can be exchanged for foreign goods 
and services.
•  By forgoing opportunities for consumption in the present, Germany acquires additional 
claims to consumer goods from abroad: if Germany exchanges its assets in the future, 
it receives a claim to goods and services from abroad. The fact that Germany now lives 
beneath its means opens up the option of it living beyond its means in the future. 
In other words, a country with an export surplus makes goods available to the rest 
of the world at the present time and allows the rest of the world to have excessive 
consumption. In return, the country with the export surplus expects the rest of the 
world to live beneath its means at some point in the future and thereby return the 
“over-consumed goods”.
Both effects are a motive for generating export surpluses in the present. In order for this 
strategy to succeed, however, it requires that the claims against foreign countries do not 
lose value. Assets accumulated vis-à-vis foreign countries – for example, investments in 
enterprises or loans to companies or the state – lose value if the enterprises or the state in 
question file for bankruptcy or if the currency of the foreign country strongly depreciates. 
In both cases, Germany would have exchanged its goods for worthless claims in an extreme 
scenario.
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BOX 1  Export surpluses and asset accumulation abroad
The fact that an export surplus is accompanied by asset accumulation abroad can be 
demonstrated using the balance of payments. It keeps track of all economic transactions 
between Germany and the rest of the world that take place within a one-year period. The 
assets side lists the activities that represent an incoming payment for Germany. If, for the 
sake of simplification, changes in the central bank‘s gold and foreign exchange holdings are 
not taken into account, there are two types of economic activity that represent incoming 
payments: the export of goods and services (EX) and capital imports (KIM) such as sales 
of shares and securities to foreign economic units or borrowing abroad. The liabilities 
side covers the activities that lead to an outgoing payment for the country, and thus the 
import of goods and services (IM) and capital exports (KEX) such as the purchase of shares 
and securities of foreign business entities. In the balance of payments, all transactions are 
posted twice. For example, the export of goods against the granting of a loan is recorded 
as an export of goods on the assets side and as an export of capital on the liabilities side. 
Therefore, the balance of payments is by definition always balanced: EX + KIM = IM + KEX. 
The transformation of this equation represents the definitional relationships between the 
trade or current account balance (EX – IM) and the capital account balance (KEX – KIM): 
that is, (EX – IM) = (KEX – KIM). An export or current account surplus (EX > IM) is therefore 
automatically accompanied by a net capital export (KEX > KIM). And when domestic capital is 
invested abroad, this means an increase in wealth held abroad.
8Since reunification, German exports have almost always been larger than imports. 
Furthermore, if one considers that since the beginning of the 2000s the German current 
account has shown a surplus, then the year 2000 can be used as the starting point to 
compare accumulated export surpluses with the change in net foreign assets. If the annual 
export surpluses between 2000 and 2017 are added up, this results in a cumulative export 
surplus in the amount of approximately EUR 2,570 billion (see Figure 1).
In order to calculate the financial resources of an economy that are available for asset 
accumulation abroad, other cash flows between Germany and the rest of the world must be 
taken into account (i.e. cross-border transfers and fees for the use of production factors). 
These cross-border financial transactions are listed in the current account. Unlike the 
German external contribution (difference between export revenues and import revenues), 
the German current account balance was negative in 2000 and 2001 (see Figure 2).
Cumulative export surpluses and 
change in net foreign assets
FIGURE 1  Overall change in German foreign trade. 
Source for the years 2000 to 2016: Statistisches Bundesamt 2017: 145. Source for 2017: Statistisches Bundesamt 2018: 13.
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9Cumulative export surpluses and change in net foreign assets
If the current account balances are added for the period between January 2000 and 
November 2017 (full data are not yet available for the year 2017), this results in a cumulative 
current account surplus for Germany of around EUR 2,480 billion. The sum of cumulative 
current account balances is almost EUR 100 billion less than the sum of cumulative export 
surpluses. The main reason for this is the transfer payments made by Germany to the rest 
of the world.
If the cumulative current account balances are used as a rough indicator of the net 
receivables of a country, German net foreign assets would have increased by EUR 2,480 
billion between 2000 and 2017. However, in reality this figure grew by only around EUR 
1,810 billion during this period (see Table 1).
TABLE 1  Germany‘s international investment position, in rounded figures
Year Assets
in EUR billion
Liabilities
in EUR billion
Net foreign assets 
in EUR billion
End 1999 = Beginning of 2000 2,507 2,443 64
End 3rd quarter 2017 8,319 6,446 1,873
Change 2000 to 2017 +5,813 +4,003 +1,810
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2018: 96.
If changes in the value of receivables and liabilities are not taken into account, the increase 
in German net foreign assets would be around EUR 670 billion larger. In other words, 
with regard to the export surpluses, this lack of growth in net foreign assets can also be 
interpreted to mean that Germany has given away goods and services amounting to around 
EUR 670 billion over the time period under review.
FIGURE 2  Germany’s annual current account balances for 2000 to 2017 (for 2017, only January to November), 
                        figures in EUR millions.
Source for the years 2000 to 2016: Statistisches Bundesamt 2017: 145. Source for 2017: Statistisches Bundesamt 2018: 13.
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When looking for the reasons for the lack of growth in net foreign assets, it is useful to 
compare the annual changes in net foreign assets with the annual current account balances 
(see Table 2).
TABLE 2  Germany‘s international investment position, in rounded figures
Year Net foreign assets in EUR 
billion (figures for end of 
the year)
Change in net foreign assets 
over previous year in EUR billion
Current account balance 
in EUR billion
1999 64   
2000 34 –30 –37
2001 142 108 –8
2002 0 –142 42
2003 17 17 31
2004 102 85 101
2005 306 204 106
2006 472 166 136
2007 471 –1 170
2008 465 –6 143
2009 614 150 141
2010 662 47 145
2011 627 –35 166
2012 787 160 194
2013 975 188 190
2014 1,198 223 218
2015 1,478 280 260
2016 1,709 231 259
2017 1,873 164 228
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2018: 96.
Reasons for the loss of assets
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Cumulative export surpluses and change in net foreign assets
Assuming there are no errors in the collection of statistics and no changes in the value of 
receivables and liabilities, theoretically the annual current account balance would have to 
be more or less in line with the change in net foreign assets for the same year. As Table 2 
shows, to some extent there are considerable differences between the two figures. These 
differences can be explained by changes in value. The net foreign assets of Germany, 
expressed in EUR, ceteris paribus, lose their value if…
•  the prices of assets (stock prices, real estate prices, security prices, etc.) abroad 
decrease;
•  foreign currency is devalued and the prices expressed in EUR for foreign assets are 
therefore lower;
• the prices of assets in Germany held by foreign investors increase;
•  German economic actors have got into debt overseas in a foreign currency (foreign 
currency loan), and the currency of that country increases in value.
Leaving aside any statistical discrepancies, the main periods responsible for the loss of 
assets are those in which there were particularly large negative deviations between the 
change in net foreign assets and the size of the current account balance. Three periods 
should be noted in this respect (see Table 2):
•  2002: The difference between the theoretically expected increase in foreign assets by 
EUR 42 billion and the actual decline in assets by EUR 142 billion is mainly attributable 
to the bursting of the dot-com bubble. This burst led to high price losses on the stock 
and securities markets worldwide.
•  2007 and 2008: The asset losses of these two years are attributable to the global 
financial crisis, which was triggered by the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble and the 
subsequent Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (see Klär, Lindner and Šehovic´   2013: 191).
•  2010 and 2011: The differences between actual capital gains and the theoretically 
expected increases of these two years are closely related to the decline in the prices 
of the bonds of the Southern European crisis states. At the same time, the inflow of 
capital into Germany through the purchase of German government bonds led to a rise 
in the price of these bonds. Federal bonds held by foreign investors represent a liability 
for Germany, meaning that the rise in German government bonds caused an increase 
in German liabilities and thus reduced net foreign assets (see Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology 2013:19).
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A comparison between cumulative German current account surpluses and changes in net 
foreign assets was carried out in 2013 by several authors and intensively discussed. Klär, 
Lindner and Šehovic´   calculated the loss of net foreign assets to be around EUR 270 billion 
for the period from 1999 to the third quarter of 2012. This corresponded to around ten 
percent of Germany‘s economic output for 2012 (see Klär, Lindner and Šehovic´   2013: 191). 
In their calculations, Baldi and Bremer arrived at a loss of wealth between 2006 and 2012 
that amounted to approximately 20 percent of Germany‘s economic output (see Baldi and 
Bremer 2013: 32).
Once these results were presented, they were evaluated in an intense discussion. As a 
general point, it can be stated that the determination of foreign assets is associated with 
a high degree of uncertainty (see Baldi and Bremer 2013: 33). The Deutsche Bundesbank 
is even of the view that problems in statistical data collection are the determining cause 
of the calculated asset losses: The vast majority of the 2007–2013 discrepancy between 
cumulative net capital flows and the increase in net foreign assets is not to be attributed to 
crisis-related asset losses, but rather can be explained by the different statistical collection 
methods and price increases in German cross-border liabilities (see Deutsche Bundesbank 
2014: 54).
In addition, it should be noted that valuation losses resulting from price and exchange rate 
fluctuations are initially only book losses. Thus, temporary valuation losses can be reversed 
in subsequent years if there is an increase in the prices of assets abroad or if the foreign 
currency appreciates. These developments can explain, for example, why the increase in 
German net foreign assets in 2005 was almost EUR 100 billion higher than the current 
account surplus of the same year (see Table 2). Valuation losses therefore become actual 
losses only when the foreign assets are (must) be sold at a loss.
Even if statistical collection problems may account for part of the calculated asset losses 
and these losses are initially only book losses, there remains the risk of real asset losses due 
to value and exchange rate fluctuations. In particular exchange rate movements affect the 
value of the German asset portfolio significantly.
Evaluation of the calculated  
loss of assets
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Exchange rate changes and  
asset losses
The importance of exchange rate movements for the development of the net foreign assets 
of an economy can be illustrated by a simple numerical example. Let‘s assume that there 
are only two countries, Germany and the United States. Germany achieves an export surplus 
of EUR 250 billion every year for ten years. For reasons of simplification, we will assume 
that there are no price fluctuations, no exchange rate changes and no depreciation of 
physical assets. The interest and dividends that German investors earn are spent by them 
for consumption purposes. The value of a euro is always one dollar during the entire ten 
years. After ten years, the value of Germany‘s foreign assets is thus EUR 2,500 billion or 
USD 2,500 billion.
At the beginning of the 11th year, there is an abrupt devaluation of the U.S. dollar by 20 
percent. USD 1 is now worth only EUR 0.80. German foreign assets continue to have a value 
of USD 2,500 billion. Because of the dollar devaluation, however, this corresponds to an 
asset of only EUR 2,000 billion. The German economy has thus suffered a loss of assets in 
the amount of EUR 500 billion. This corresponds to the export surplus of two years. Since 
appreciation and depreciation of 20 percent within a short period of time are quite possible, 
such asset fluctuations are not unrealistic. For example, in the period from 2000 to 2017, 
the value of a euro (average value throughout the entire year) fluctuated between USD 0.89 
(2001) and USD 1.47 (2008, see Figure 3). In the space of two years, there was both a nearly 
twenty percent appreciation of the euro (between 2002 and 2003) and a 16.5 percent euro 
devaluation between 2014 and 2015.
FIGURE 3  Value of EUR 1 in USD (average for the year).
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2018: 100.
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Exchange rate changes and asset losses 
Exacerbating this situation is the fact that the German export surpluses – and their 
corresponding U.S. trade deficits – in turn have an influence on the exchange rate of the two 
currencies:
•  The exports of a country represent the demand for the currency of that country on the 
foreign exchange market. If Americans want to buy German products, they must pay for 
them in euros, because the German companies pay their expenses (wages, rents, leases, 
interest, taxes, etc.) in euros. German exports thus ensure a demand for the euro on the 
international currency markets.
•  The imports of a country represent the supply of that country‘s currency on the foreign 
exchange market. If German consumers want to buy American products, they must pay 
for them in U.S. dollars for the reasons mentioned above. In order to acquire dollars, 
they must offer euros on the foreign exchange markets and exchange them for U.S. 
dollars.
For a country with an export surplus, these relationships lead to an appreciation of the 
domestic currency:
•  In the case of an export surplus, by definition the country‘s exports are larger than its 
imports. Consequently, the demand for the currency of that country is greater than the 
supply of that currency.
•  A demand greater than the supply results in an increase in the price of the currency 
traded. The value of the currency is increasing, so there is an appreciation.
For the currency of a country with a trade deficit (that is, exports are lower than imports), 
these relationships lead to a devaluation.
The interplay of trade imbalances and exchange rate changes will then inevitably lead to a 
loss of wealth for the country that generates an export surplus and in return acquires assets 
abroad. Related to the Germany-U.S. example outlined above, the following developments 
occur (see Figure 4):
•  The German export surplus leads to a net capital export and thus to an asset 
accumulation on the part of German investors in the U.S.
•  At the same time, the annual export surpluses cause the U.S. dollar to lose value against 
the euro each year. Thus the U.S. dollar is devalued every year.
•  For the foreign assets of the German economy, expressed in euros, this means that 
these assets suffer depreciation-related losses every year.
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Exchange rate changes and asset losses 
As long as Germany generates export surpluses, currency-related asset losses are inevitable. 
In the long term, however, it should be borne in mind that demographic change, which is 
indeed a motive for German export surpluses, could compensate for these currency-related 
asset losses.
FIGURE 4  The relationship between trade imbalances and exchange rate changes. 
Source: author’s own representation.
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Demographic change – and above all the ageing of the population – has significant 
macroeconomic consequences. Among the most important are the following (see Lindh, 
Malmberg and Petersen 2010):
•  If a growing number of retirees and pensioners encounter a shrinking workforce, it also 
means that there is a tendency for excess demand on goods markets. This leaves fewer 
goods and services for export, so that an existing export surplus becomes smaller.
•  The consequence of a tendency for excess demand is an increase in the prices of goods. 
Rising prices worsen the international competitiveness of an economy and therefore 
reduce its exports.
•  The disposable income of retirees and pensioners tends to be lower than the disposable 
income of the working population. Lower-income households are characterized by 
the fact that they have less of a possibility to accumulate savings. In an ageing society, 
therefore, savings decline in the aggregate. Decreasing savings mean that a higher 
proportion of domestic added value is needed in Germany. This reduces the country‘s 
export potential.
•  With an ageing workforce, ultimately both labor productivity and innovation tend to 
decline. This also has a negative impact on the competitiveness of the country and in 
addition further reduces the export surplus.
Ultimately, it can therefore be assumed that the ageing of society will serve to reduce an 
existing export surplus and, in the long term, even lead to a trade deficit. This will also lead 
to a devaluation of the currency of the ageing society or to an appreciation of the currency in 
countries with a young and growing population.
For Germany, this means that over the long term, an appreciation of the currencies in which 
the current export surpluses are invested is to be expected. As a result, the asset losses 
related to exchange rates that are incurred in the export surplus phase could be recouped in 
the future.
Demographic change and changes 
in the exchange rate
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Conclusion and outlook
The calculations made in this paper are only a very rough approximation to the valuation of 
German net foreign assets. Nevertheless, there is evidence that asset losses in the hundreds 
of billions occurred in the period under review here. Short-term asset losses, which 
represent only book losses, are unproblematic if the prices of the assets affected increase 
again over the long term.
The decisive factor is the value of foreign investment, expressed in euros, if Germany 
converts these assets back into money sometime in the future, in order to acquire goods and 
services in return, so that material well-being can be ensured even in the face of an ageing 
society. Whether price and currency-related asset losses are then actually compensated 
cannot be predicted. Such an assertion is not possible because the uncertainties regarding 
the long-term preservation of value of the investments abroad associated with the current 
export surpluses are too great.
In view of these uncertainties and the fact that Germany shows a considerable weakness in 
macroeconomic investment (see Box 2), it would be quite conceivable that higher domestic 
investments could constitute a better macroeconomic provision to deal with the ageing 
of the population. If Germany succeeds in increasing private and public investment in the 
future, this could potentially be a more sustainable macroeconomic preparation strategy for 
the ageing of the population. At the same time, higher domestic investment would boost 
domestic demand and thus reduce the German export surplus and current account surplus. 
This could also reduce the growing international criticism of German current account 
surpluses.
BOX 2  Investment gap in Germany
The fact that an investment gap exists in Germany is largely undisputed. With regard to the 
period from 1999 to 2012, DIW Berlin calculated an annual macroeconomic investment 
gap of three percent of German economic output, or EUR 75 billion, in 2013 (see Fratzscher, 
Gornig and Schiersch 2016: 275). In a study published in 2014, the German Association of 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) said that there was an annual macroeconomic 
investment gap of almost EUR 80 billion – EUR 60 billion in the private sector and EUR 18 
billion in state infrastructure (see DIHK 2014: 4).
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